Sarkozy: ‘Lisbon treaty would have helped in Georgia crisis’
And what would these ‘tools’ have been, precisely?
Everything which HM Government denies is on the cards.
He specifically refers to the ‘High Representative for Foreign Affairs’, endowed with ‘a real European diplomatic service and considerable financial means in order to put decisions into force in coordination with member states’.
This is nothing short of a unified foreign policy, usurping those of national governments, permitting the Union to speak with one voice whilst muting the individual voices of each member state, irrespective of their unique issues of national security or foreign policy interests. According to President Sarkozy, the role of the ‘President of Europe’ in such circumstances would have been to act ‘in close consultation’ with heads of state.
That’s nice. The UK might be consulted by the President, but, rather like the Central Bank, national governments would be unable to make demands or assert any influence.
EU Observer notes: ‘This would very much put the President in the foreign policy field. It would also foresee a formal hierarchy among member states as it would give priority to those considered most affected. This kind of scenario has been predicted by some smaller member states who fear that the president would have an all-powerful role, reducing the say of certain governments, although the working principle of the bloc is that member states are equal.’
Well, in the EU, some are more equal than others, and thus it ever was.
The Treaty of Lisbon is the beginning of the end of the United Kingdom as a key player in international politics, and it constitutes a negation of the defence of its global interests. The British Empire forged links and secured interests throughout the world, and many of these are sustained through the British Commonwealth. It has been the mechanism by which parliamentary government, legal and financial systems, the English language and the Christian faith have spread throughout the world. While it has occasionally erred, British foreign policy has historically been a manifest force for good in the world. Yet it is to be subsumed to the nebulous and undefined ‘aims and objectives’ of the European Union.
And since most of the strategic interests of the UK are antithetical to those of the EU, one can only wonder at which nation the aims and objectives of the Union shall eventually find a high degree of synonymity.